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Abstract
We conduct an experiment to investigate how different information about social norms affects
individuals’ stated contributions to a specific pro-environment program, a student “green
fee,” in the context of a referendum. Compared to students that receive no information about
peer contributions, on average, students that receive information about the dollar value
range of contributions at peer institutions contribute less while students that learn about the
high percentage of students voting “yes” on green fee programs at peer institutions contribute
more. The results are economically significant as the absolute values of both effects represent
approximately 25% of average contributions. These results suggest that information about
participation rates can be more effective than information about dollar amounts in
encouraging contributions to environmental initiatives. Of interest to stated preference
researchers, we find that results do not change when controlling for self-selection into survey
completion.
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Introduction

Previous research has uncovered multiple settings in which people tend to conform to a peer
group’s participation in a pro-environmental behavior. For example, Goldstein et al. (2008)
find that providing descriptive social norms motivate hotel guests to reuse their towels more
effectively than providing information about environmental benefits. A group of studies finds
that providing information to consumers about neighbors’ energy usage can reduce energy
consumption (Allcott, 2011; Ayres et al., 2012; Nolan et al., 2008; Schultz et al., 2007).
Similarly, information about others’ water usage can affect behavior (Ferraro et al., 2011;
Ferraro et al., 2013). In each of these cases, individuals are choosing to behave in a more
environmentally friendly manner because of a social norm. However, social norms in a given
context can often be described in a variety of ways. Specifically, many behaviors can be
described in terms of participation rates (extensive margin) or the intensity of participation
(intensive margin). We seek to analyze which of these descriptors is more effective in
motivating pro-social behavior. Therefore, our first contribution to the social norms literature
is that we examine the effects of information about both the extensive and intensive qualities
of a reference group’s behavior.1
Moreover, in the real world, often the amount of a public good provided depends on a
vote rather than a series of individual actions. For example, many countries, states, and
localities decide referenda via the ballot on public policies including issues such as increased
school funding, increased open space or trail ways, and increased fire or police services.
Organizations spend vast amounts of money attempting to garner support for their
referenda, often appealing to the social benefits of the policy. Perhaps information about
social norms could be more persuasive. Thus, our second contribution to the social norms
literature is that we examine the effects of information about a reference group’s contribution
in the context of a referendum. Specifically, we investigate how differing types of information
about a peer group’s behavior affect university students’ stated contributions for
environmental improvement programs.
There has recently been a push in the campus sustainability movement across the US.
For example, 685 schools have signed on to the American College & University President’s

Throughout the manuscript, we use the term “extensive” as a measure of how many people
participate in the behavior and the term “intensive” as a measure of how frequently or intensely
people participate in a behavior.
1
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Climate Commitment. Signatories commit to develop a plan to eliminate net greenhouse gas
emissions. Other schools have investigated the possibility of joining the commitment but
concerns about the costs of reducing carbon emissions during a period of increasing budgetary
pressures have prevented signing. In turn, students at many institutions have searched for
ways to fund environmentally focused programs such as the President’s Climate
Commitment. The “green fee” has emerged as a partial solution at over 70 known colleges
and universities. Through referenda, students establish a “green fund” from extra student
fees that supports purchasing renewable energy produced off-campus and/or funding
renewable energy and energy conservation projects on-campus.2
We utilize a survey of 559 students at a U.S. Midwestern liberal arts university
(hereafter MLAU) to test for differences in students’ reported contributions to “green fee”
programs based upon the type of peer information provided. We test for effects from social
norms information with a treatment that describes the range of green fee dollar values
adopted at peer institutions (dollar value treatment), a treatment that describes both the
number of institutions that have adopted green fees and the percentage of students at peer
institutions that have voted “yes” to the implementation of green fees (extent of participation
treatment), and a treatment that presents all of the information combined in the first two
treatments (combination treatment). Each of these treatments is then tested against a
control group that receives no information about peers. Under the assumption that any
hypothetical bias in our stated preference surveys affects only levels but not differential
responses to treatments, we find that information given about a peer group significantly
impacts respondents’ reported contributions. Interestingly, the two types of information
about social norms (extensive and intensive) have opposite effects on stated contributions.
Both t-tests for difference in means between groups and regression analysis confirm
that gaining information about the dollar value of peer green fee contributions results in a
decrease in mean contributions of about $8 to $9 and gaining information about the high
participation rate of peers in green fee programs at other institutions results in an increase
in mean contributions of about $7 to $8. Presenting both pieces of information together into
one treatment leads to no change in mean contributions relative to the control group.

The Association for the Advancement of Sustainability in Higher Education (AASHE) provides
extensive information about higher education green fees in the United States (AASHE, Dedicated
Student Fees for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency).
2
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A common concern with survey data is that the pool of respondents may not be
representative of the population because individuals self-select into completing the survey.
This can potentially bias the results in several areas including the stated contribution
amount and the size of the treatment effects. Fortunately, we have access to several key
variables about each individual in the domestic student population of MLAU and we can link
this information to the completed surveys so we can build a model to explain the survey
participation decision. Utilizing a Heckman sample selection model, we find that official
grade point average, race/ethnicity, and gender associate significantly with the survey
participation decision. However, the treatment effects are qualitatively similar between the
models that do and do not control for sample selection. It may be reassuring to other stated
preference researchers that there is little to no difference when accounting for the sample
selection.

2

Related Literature

The power of social norms has been documented in a variety of contexts in the psychology
literature. Steg and Vlek (2009) recognize the influence of social norms as one of the factors
influencing environmental behavior. Two examples in an environmental context include
Cialdini et al. (1990) and Cialdini et al. (2006). In this literature, descriptive social norms are
described as, “informing individuals of what is likely to be effective or adaptive behavior in
that situation” (Goldstein et al. 2008). This is very similar to the idea of “conformity” in the
economics literature, where the more commonly accepted definition of conformity relates to
a social phenomenon where individuals take cues from others as to what is acceptable
behavior. For example, Bardsley and Sausgruber state that conformity, “involves perceiving
others’ behavior as a guide to what is socially or morally appropriate. It therefore predicts
that people may conform independently of the material consequences of doing so” (Bardsley
and Sausgruber, 2005). A related phenomenon in the economics literature has been termed
“reciprocity,” which predicts a matching behavior where individuals attempt to match others’
contribution levels. The distinction here is that reciprocity is driven by a desire to create
fairness whereas conformity does not have its roots in a desire of fairness but rather in a
desire to not deviate from the actions of others.
Conformity and reciprocity are often difficult to separately identify because both
motivators will give rise to “conditional cooperation,” which broadly states that individuals
4

contribute more to a public good when others also contribute. As pointed out by Frey and
Meier (2004), there are at least three theoretical explanations that can explain the results of
their study. People may want to conform to a social norm, people may desire fairness and
hence exhibit reciprocity behavior, and contributions by others might signal the quality of
the public good (Vesterlund, 2003). A group of field experiments have examined the extent of
conditional cooperation in a variety of contexts including movie rating behavior (Chen et al.,
2010), contributions of students in Zurich to social funds supporting other students (Frey and
Meier, 2004), contributions to a radio station (Shang and Croson, 2009; Croson and Shang,
2008), contributions to cross-country track maintenance (Heldt, 2006), and museum
donations to transparent boxes (Martin and Randal, 2008).
The effect of information about a reference group’s contributions on stated
contributions has not been studied as much. Alpizar et al. (2008) investigate whether
information about the contributions matters more for hypothetical contributions than for
actual contributions at a national park in Costa Rica. They state, “as far as we know, no
previous study has looked directly at how information about the contributions of others
affects stated contributions” (Alpizar et al., 2008). While they do find a substantial
hypothetical bias, they do not find that the influence of peer information is larger for stated
contributions compared to actual contributions. Hypothetical bias has also been documented
in many environmental valuation studies.3 However, given that we are more interested in
how the average contribution changes in response to differential information and are less
concerned with the absolute baseline contribution amount we abstract from any hypothetical
bias concerns.

3

Survey Description

Prior to conducting the survey, we held focus groups with 25 students to discuss their
opinions about green fees and to learn the relevant range of contributions for the payment
card portion of the survey. During October of 2011, we conducted a survey of 559 MLAU
students. The entire MLAU student population, which is approximately 1850 students, was
contacted via direct email solicitation making the response rate approximately 30 percent.
Potential respondents were provided a link in the email to the online survey, hosted by

See Whitehead and Cherry (2007) for an overview of many studies documenting hypothetical bias
and the approaches that researchers have taken to mitigate the bias.
3
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SurveyGizmo. Respondents could only access the survey via the link in their email, which
ensured that each respondent only completed the survey once. On the welcome page of the
survey, respondents were informed that the purpose of the study is to find out how MLAU
students view environmental issues and to gage the level of support for increasing funding
for sustainability projects on campus. Respondents learned that the results of the survey
would be shared with campus decision makers including the administration, faculty
committees, and the MLAU Council on Student Affairs. As there was recent talk on campus
about the President’s Climate Commitment and potential green fees, respondents had
sufficient reason to take the hypothetical fee referendum seriously.
In the introduction of the survey, students learn about the recent and current
environmental initiatives on MLAU’s campus. The subsequent section gathers information
about the respondents’ environmental awareness and extent of “green” behavior. These
questions are important because they can potentially explain differences in willingness to
contribute to a green fee. The second section of the survey informs MLAU students that
MLAU recently received a B- from the College Sustainability Report Card and enumerates
several of the components that contribute to that ranking. This section also inquires about
respondents’ priorities for environmental improvements on campus.
The third section of the survey contains the green fee contribution question. After
explaining what a green fee is, our contribution question is phrased as,

Suppose a ballot initiative has been drafted to create a mandatory green fee for all
students. Also, suppose that all students are given the opportunity to vote. The
initiative will pass if it receives more “yes” votes than “no” votes. If passed, the
initiative will establish a certain dollar amount per semester that each student will
be required to pay in the form of a fee charged to your student account.
What is the maximum dollar amount per semester for which you would vote "yes" on
this referendum for a mandatory green fee? (Select one dollar amount)
Please keep in mind your own personal financial situation and how the proposed fee
would affect your personal budget.
Respondents then select a dollar amount from a payment card having fees ranging
from $0 to $100 per semester in $5 increments.
We randomly assign our sample into four groups (a control and three treatment
groups). The control group receives no information about peer institutions. Treatment 1
6

(Dollar Value Treatment) describes the range of green fees adopted at peer institutions. The
exact wording of the addition to the contribution question compared to the control group is,

In recent years, students in many schools have voted to pay a certain amount of money
along with their tuition to support the campus sustainability movement. The amount
of fees charged at other universities ranges between $1 per credit of class to $80 per
year.
We gathered this information about the range of fees from AASHE. While presenting
respondents with varying dollar amounts for the range would have increased the variation
in our data and potentially facilitated a more precise estimate of this dollar value effect, we
wanted to avoid providing respondents with false information. A certain percentage of
students on campus is quite active environmentally and would plausibly know if we were
lying to them about green fees at peer institutions. We wanted to limit the study to the effects
from true information.
Treatment 2 (Extent of Participation Treatment) describes both the number of
institutions that have adopted green fees and the percentage of students at peer institutions
that have voted “yes” to the implementation of green fees. The exact wording of the addition
to the contribution question compared to the control group is,

In recent years, students in many schools have voted to pay a certain amount of money
along with their tuition to support the campus sustainability movement. Today, there
are more than 70 colleges and universities known to have student green fees. The
number of institutions starting student green funds is steadily increasing.
When put to a student referendum, on average, 85% of the student body at the known
schools voted for passing the green fee referendum. For example, 85% of students
from the College of William and Mary voted for the referendum, 77% of students from
University of Illinois voted for "Yes", and 81% from Appalachian State University
voted for "Yes".
Again, this information was gathered from (AASHE). As with the previous treatment, we
considered varying the number of green fee institutions and the percentage of the student
body voting yes. However, we decided that it was preferable to avoid introducing any false
information to the survey.

7

Treatment 3 (Combination Treatment) combines the information from Treatment 1
and Treatment 2. That is, respondents receive information both on the dollar value and the
extent of participation at peer institutions.4
As a follow-up question to all of the groups, we ask respondents how certain they are
that their vote will influence student green fee policy at MLAU. The fourth and final section
of the survey collects confidential demographic information.

4

Data and Descriptive Analysis

As previously stated, 559 respondents completed the survey. Summary statistics for all
variables are given in Table 1 and a description of all variables is in Appendix A. For
comparison, the overall MLAU student population is roughly 46 percent male, ten percent
international, and 25 percent varsity athletes. As seen in Table 1, approximately forty
percent of the sample completed the control version and twenty percent of the sample
completed one of the three treatment versions.5 As a starting point, we break the sample into
the control and three treatment groups to get a sense of how the treatments affect
contribution levels. We reject the null that the means of the four groups are jointly equal (pvalue = 0.0002). Table 2 reports the results for the t-tests for difference in means between
the control and treatment groups. In each case, the relevant treatment group is tested against
the control group. We find that Treatment 1 (Dollar Value) has a significantly lower mean
contribution than the control group and Treatment 2 (Extent of Participation) has a
significantly higher mean contribution that the control group. The mean of Treatment 3
(Combination) is statistically no different from the mean of the control group.
To examine this further, we analyze the distributions of contributions across the
groups. Figures 1 through 4 present histograms of the contribution amounts for the control
and three treatment groups. As shown in Figure 1, the most frequent contribution amount
in the control group is $20, followed closely by $0 and $50 per semester. Relative to the control
group, Treatment 1 (Dollar Value) displays a larger percentage of low-level contributions

At the design stage, we expected both Treatment 1 and Treatment 2 to increase mean student
contributions, and hence, Treatment 3 to perhaps increase contributions even further. Based on the
focus groups, we expected most students in the control group would be willing to contribute $0-$10 a
semester. Evidently, we underestimated the number of students who would be much more generous
absent peer information.
5 Students were randomly assigned to one of the 4 groups.
4
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(Figure 2). Recall that the referenced peer contribution range in Treatment 1 is $1 per credit
to $80 per year. Thus, individuals would likely infer that the average contribution is
somewhere in the $20 per semester range.6 Concentrating on the upper half of the payment
card options, it appears that Treatment 1 is “missing” a percentage of high-level contributors
relative to the control group. It seems that many of these individuals move down to match
the dollar amounts that are referenced for the peer institutions. There is little change in the
$0 contribution frequency, but the $5 to $15 contribution amounts pick up many more
individuals in Treatment 1 compared to the control group. In other words, at first glance, it
looks like Treatment 1 (Dollar Value) changes the intensity of contributions but not the
frequency of positive contributions.
Next, in Figure 3, we see that Treatment 2 (Extent of Participation) has fewer
individuals in the lower third of the payment card options relative to the control group. Recall
that this extent of participation treatment informs participants that 85 percent of students
at known institutions voted for passing a green fee when put to a ballot. Participants receive
no information on the dollar amount of the average contribution at other institutions.
Interestingly, there is a large reduction in the number of individuals choosing to contribute
$0 in Treatment 2 compared to the control group. Students that perhaps previously would
have contributed $0 to a green fee may increase their contribution amount after learning of
the high participation rates of peers. The upper end of the distribution doesn’t seem as
different from the control. However, there may be a shift toward $50 and $100 and away from
the contributions in the $60 to $80 range.
Treatment 3’s (Combination Treatment) histogram looks quite similar to the control
group and is shown in Figure 4. There may be a slight shift toward the $50 contribution
amount relative to the control, but the overall pattern of contributions in Treatment 3 is
visually not much different from the control. It seems that the two pieces of information may
be effectively negating each other. Some respondents may be revising up their contributions
while others are simultaneously revising down their contributions relative to what they
would have done absent any information. Or, it may be that few or none of the respondents
are revising their contributions relative to what we would have observed absent the two types
of peer information.
Almost 100% of MLAU students are full time students, corresponding to 8-9 credit hours per
academic year. Thus, they would likely interpret this range as about $8-$80 per year ($4-$40 per
semester).
6
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Table 3 shows the number of individuals in each group that did not contribute
anything to the hypothetical green fee. In Treatment 2 (Extent of Participation) there are
about half as many individuals that refuse to contribute any dollar amount compared to the
other groups. T-tests for differences in the probability of a positive contribution confirm that
the probability is statistically different for Treatment 2 (Extent of Participation) compared
to the control (p-value=0.027) and Treatment 1 (Dollar Value) (p-value =0.042).

5

Main Regression Results

To further explain differences in contributions between treatments and to explore differences
in contributions due to other systematic factors, we next turn to multiple regression analysis.
We pool the data and use both individual characteristics and indicator variables representing
treatment groups as independent variables for each of the regressions, where the control
group is the comparison group. Thus, the regression equation is
(1)

𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 = 𝑋𝑖 𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖 ,

where 𝑋𝑖 is a vector containing individual characteristics and indicators for the treatments
and 𝜀𝑖 is a normal error term for individual i. As a baseline, we present OLS results. 7
However, since we collect payment card responses for contribution levels, we have responses
that are right-censored at $100, responses that are left-censored at $0, and interval
observations. Thus, we employ a maximum-likelihood interval regression in addition to the
OLS regression. 8 An OLS regression could result in biased regression coefficients and
maximum-likelihood interval regression is more efficient than OLS regression for interval
data. Nevertheless, it is often informative to present OLS results alongside the interval
regression results to see how they compare (Cameron, Huppert 1989). Here, in Table 4, we
present only the reduced OLS and MLE regressions.9 We note that the results are similar for

For OLS regressions, contributions at the endpoints of 0 and 100 are coded at those levels. Other
contribution amounts are coded as the mid-point of the payment card intervals.
8 We utilize Stata’s intreg command for the interval regression.
9 From the full model, we drop fullloadlaundry, lightingwaste, heatacwaste, drivingtrips,
recyclepaper, and foodwaste because these are all variables that measure environmental behaviors
and attitudes and all have p-values higher than 0.2 in the full OLS regression. We also drop age
because this information is already largely captured in yearinschool. Finally, we drop #roommates
because of its high p-value and lack of theoretical relationship with the level of one’s contributions to
a green fee. A partial F-test and Wald test confirm that the dropped variables are insignificant
predictors of green fee contributions. Results for the full model are available upon request.
7
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OLS and for the MLE interval regressions. Treatments 1 and 2 are significantly different
from the control group in each regression.10
Because the interval regression model is preferred for payment card data, we focus on
interpreting those results.

We examine the significance of the indicator variables

treatment1, treatment2, and treatment3 for evidence of information about social norms
affecting behavior. The negative and significant sign on treatment1 agrees with what we see
in Figure 2 compared to Figure 1. Gaining information about the dollar range of contributions
at peer institutions causes a decrease in average contributions of about $8.09. This confirms
what we find in the t-test for difference in means, as the difference there is $8.50. Again, the
average contribution that participants would infer from the dollar value information falls in
the bottom portion of the contributions that we see in the control group. So, relative to the
control, some participants in Treatment 1 revise down their contributions to be closer to their
newly gained perceptions of their peers.
The positive and significant sign on treatment2 also confirms that pattern we see in
Figure 3 compared to Figure 1. Learning about the extent of participation in green fee
programs at peer institutions causes an increase in average contributions of about $7.25.
This agrees with the t-test from Section 4, where the difference is $7.10. One explanation is
that respondents in this treatment are now inferring that the average peer contribution is
higher than what they would have expected prior to receiving the participation information.
Because the perceived peer contribution exceeds a participant’s original contribution amount
for at least a portion of the treatment group, some Treatment 2 participants increase their
reported contribution.
The environmental behavior variables of showertime, turnofflight, and doubleprint
are statistically and economically significant. They also have the expected signs in that
students who report exhibiting green behaviors are willing to contribute more to the green
fee program. Respondents that are more certain that their vote will influence green fee policy
at MLAU are willing to contribute more to the green fee program. As for demographics, males
are willing to contribute a significantly higher amount than are females. The scale of this
difference is also quite large, estimated at around $10.51. Previous research has found a
larger hypothetical bias in males than females, which could explain at least some of this
We also examine a specification that interacts the treatments with observable characteristics to
investigate whether the magnitudes of Treatments 1 and 2 depend on these characteristics.
However, none of the interaction terms are significant.
10
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difference (Brown and Taylor, 2000). Interestingly, students with higher GPA’s contribute
more as well. This may be similar to previous findings that more highly educated individuals
are more pro-environmental in their behaviors. It is also interesting that income is not found
to be a significant predictor of green fee contribution level. However, over 85 percent of the
sample reports their income falls either in the “less than $2000” or “$2000-$5000” categories
so there is not a great deal of variation to work with here.

6

Selection Model Results

There is always a concern with survey data that the sample responses may not be
representative of the population. Furthermore, respondents who care more about the issues
of the survey may be more likely to respond to the survey. In the context at hand, the
contribution amounts will be biased upwards if respondents who care more about
environmental issues are more likely to respond to the survey and are also more likely to
contribute more to the green fee. More troublesome yet for the objectives of this study,
students who decide to complete the survey may respond differentially to peer information
than students who decide not to complete the survey. This could imply that we are
overestimating or underestimating the treatment effects in the population by utilizing this
sample. The appropriate response in this situation would be to specify a (Heckman) sample
selection model. We typically do not have data that will allow us to do so because we do not
typically have information about the people who declined taking the survey. However,
fortunately in this case, we are able to gather some information about all MLAU students
with the cooperation of the University administration.
We return to the regression model (equation 1) and add a selection condition,
(2)

𝑍𝑖 𝛾 + 𝜇𝑖 > 0,

where 𝑍𝑖 is the vector of characteristics that explain the participation decision and 𝜇𝑖 is a
normal error term. An individual participates in the survey if the selection condition holds
true. We observe the dependent variable (contribution amount) only for individuals that
participate in the survey. The typical Heckman selection model then stipulates that 𝜀 and 𝜇
have correlation 𝜌. If 𝜌 ≠ 0, estimates of equation (1) that ignore the sample selection will be
biased. To produce consistent estimates in the presence of sample selection, one can either
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utilize full information maximum likelihood estimation or Heckman’s (1979) two-step
estimator of the model (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005).11
We receive information from university administration about students’ official GPA’s,
recorded gender, races/ethnicities, and home addresses.12 Given the home address, we create
a regional dummy for the student’s home state using the Census Region definitions from the
U.S. Census Bureau (2013). All states are classified according to West, Midwest, Northeast,
and South. We therefore have five geographic regions in total when including international
students. Ethnicity is self-identified according to the definitions for race and ethnicity of the
Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (2013). Individuals first designate
ethnicity as “Hispanic or Latino” or “Not Hispanic or Latino.” Then, individuals indicate one
or more races from “American Indian or Alaska Native,” “Asian,” “Black or African
American,” “Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander,” and “White.” Individuals can only
fall into one of the race/ethnicity categories in the data that we have from the University
administration so we use “White” as our comparison category for the regression analysis.
We assume that the decision to participate in the survey is a function of the variables
that the university has provided for all students: geographic region, official GPA, gender, and
race/ethnicity. Identification of the Heckman selection model requires at least one variable
in the selection equation (2) that does not appear in the regression equation (1); geographic
region and race/ethnicity serve this purpose in our application. Significant variables in the
selection equation include official GPA, gender, and “Black or African American.” 13 We
assume that the stated contribution to the green fee is a function of the independent variables
from the survey that we use in the reduced regressions in Table 4.
The typical Heckman sample selection model does not accommodate an interval
dependent variable. However, Roodman’s (2011) cmp framework does accommodate sample
selection with an interval dependent variable. The cmp framework is a user-written
maximum likelihood estimator for Stata, building on seemingly unrelated regressions
(Roodman, 2011). Analogous to Table 4, we once again present two sets of results for the

Heckman’s (1979) two-step procedure first estimates a probit model for sample inclusion and then
includes the inverse of the Mill’s ratio in the regression equation. Stata’s maximum likelihood
version of the Heckman model supports the Huber/White/sandwich estimator of variance and is
hence our model of choice. The two-step results are similar and available upon request.
12 This information is given to us in a way that does not identify the individual.
13 First stage results from the selection equation are omitted from the table for readability but
available upon request.
11
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sample selection estimates in Table 5; Column I shows the basic MLE sample selection
results and Column II shows the interval MLE sample selection results. The magnitudes of
the treatment effects for Treatment 1 and Treatment 2 are similar to those from the
corresponding columns of Table 4 and both of these treatments remain statistically
significant at conventional levels. There is evidence in both columns that the selection
equation is correlated with the regression equation, implying that students’ contributions are
correlated with their probability of completing the survey. However, it does not appear that
accounting for this self-selection leads to substantially different conclusions about the
population parameters in this application. This is perhaps comforting to other economists
who rely on stated preference studies using undergraduate participants.

7 Conclusion
We extend the literature on social norms with a stated preference study concerning
contributions to student funded environmental improvement programs in the context of a
referendum. These “green fee” programs continue to gain popularity on campuses across the
country and are a good example of the types of referenda we see at the voting booth. We
analyze effects on students’ stated contributions both from t-tests for differences in means
between survey groups and maximum likelihood regressions that control for individual
characteristics including stated environmental behaviors. Furthermore, these results are
robust to models that controls for the self-selection of students into completing the survey.
When soliciting support for a pro-social referendum, one might be wise to reveal only
information regarding the participation rate of peers, given the participation rate is high. By
revealing information about the dollar value of peer contributions, some individuals that
previously might have been much more generous than their peers will potentially revise down
their contributions to be more in line with those of their peers. We find that providing
information about the range of green fee contributions from students at peer institutions
results in a decrease in average contributions of approximately twenty five percent ($8.00)
relative to the control group that receives no information about others’ contributions. In
contrast, providing only information about the number of schools that have green fees and
the percentage of students that have voted in favor of such fees results in a similarly scaled
increase in average contributions.

14

These findings motivate several interesting unanswered questions. One important
extension would be to establish how total contributions change in response to differential
peer participation rates. Another important extension would be to investigate whether
revisions in response to peer contribution dollar amounts are asymmetric. That is, for a given
absolute divergence in ex ante contribution, perhaps individuals are more likely to revise
down their contributions to match their peers than to revise up their contributions to match
their peers. Or, perhaps the extent of the revision differs based upon whether the peer
reference point is higher or lower than one’s ex ante contribution level.
We do not have a survey design that allows us to separate conformity and reciprocity
effects. One possible explanation for the observed behavior is that students are conforming
to the social norm that has been established at peer institutions regardless of the equity
implications. An alternative explanation is that students are concerned about fairness. The
bulk of established green fees go toward energy efficiency and renewable energy production
that have local, regional, and global impacts. In another context, perhaps the horizontal zone
of influence of the pollutant could be helpful in separating out the conformity and reciprocity
effects. As it is apparent that reciprocity or conformity or both are present in stated
contribution levels, it would be interesting to pose a series of questions to respondents to
tease out their motivations for giving. Similarly, it would be interesting to see if students
react differently to information about peers at their own institutions versus peers at other
places of higher education.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics, n=559

Variable
contribution
showertime
fullloadlaundry
turnofflight
lightingwaste
heatacwaste
drivingtrips
recyclepaper
foodwaste
doubleprint
greenwork
certainty
age
male
international
athletic
yearinschool
economics
environmental
studies
science
socialscience
humanities
arts
sports management
liveoncampus
#roommates
gpa
income ($ 1000’s)
treatment1
treatment2
treatment3
control

Mean
31.816
12.397
0.889
0.893
6.299
5.637
1.934
0.800
12.688
0.274
0.458
4.018
19.742
0.326
0.088
0.186
2.494
0.109

Std.
Dev.
27.98
5.703
0.314
0.310
2.088
2.282
3.337
0.401
12.464
0.446
0.499
2.622
1.294
0.469
0.283
0.389
1.117
0.312

Min
0
2.5
0
0
1
1
0
0
5
0
0
0
17
0
0
0
1
0

Max
100
25
1
1
10
10
13.5
1
87.5
1
1
10
23
1
1
1
4
1

0.029
0.360
0.356
0.150
0.068
0.021
0.891
2.138
3.371
3.979
0.193
0.202
0.215
0.390

0.167
0.480
0.479
0.358
0.252
0.145
0.312
1.591
0.429
9.440
0.395
0.402
0.411
0.389

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1.83
1
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
5
3.83
100
1
1
1
1
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Table 2: T-tests for Differences in Mean Contributions.

Group
Treatment 1
Control (Dollar
Value)
31.83
23.33***
28.52
24.26

Treatment 2
(Extent of
Participation)
38.94**
29.14

Treatment 3
(Combination)

Mean Contribution
32.71
Standard Deviation
27.29
Treatment Mean –
-8.50
7.10
0.873
Control Mean
n
218
108
113
120
t-stat
-2.81
2.12
0.277
p-value
0.0054
0.0353
0.782
Note: *Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%.

Table 3: Prevalence of $0 Contributions

Group

# of $0 Contributions

(% of Group)

Control
Treatment 1 (Dollar Value)
Treatment 2 (Extent of Participation)
Treatment 3 (Combination)

34
17
8
14

(15.6)
(15.74)
(7.08)**
(11.67)

Note: *Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant
at 1%.
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Table 4: Reduced Regression Model Results
I. OLS
II. MLE
-6.833 **
-8.085 **
(2.866)
(3.478)
treatment2 (Extent of Participation)
5.877 *
7.247 *
(3.252)
(3.803)
treatment3 (Combination)
1.228
1.428
(2.939)
(3.471)
showertime
-0.408 *
-0.490 *
(0.213)
(0.259)
turnofflight
6.167 *
8.008 *
(3.606)
(4.415)
doubleprint
8.124 ***
9.784 ***
(2.690)
(3.096)
greenwork
3.929 *
4.414
(2.312)
(2.743)
certainty
2.240 ***
2.874 ***
(0.453)
(0.537)
male
9.625 ***
10.507 ***
(2.745)
(3.271)
international
-7.444 *
-6.737
(4.181)
(4.913)
athlete
-4.267
-5.224 *
(2.640)
(3.111)
yearinschool
1.244
1.373
(1.125)
(1.276)
science
8.953 ***
10.223 ***
(3.332)
(3.808)
socialscience
5.129
5.203
(3.315)
(3.764)
sports management
-13.955 ***
-17.326 ***
(4.707)
(6.664)
liveoncampus
-3.841
-3.842
(3.818)
(4.488)
gpa survey
4.812 *
5.570 *
(2.644)
(3.163)
income
-0.130
-0.191
(0.114)
(0.163)
constant
-4.032
-10.446
(12.570)
(14.494)
F/W Test Statistic
7.92
142.31
R-Squared
0.19
Sigma
25.69
29.64
AIC
5226.77
3185.05
n
559
559
Partial F/W Statistic
0.75
7.13
Note: *Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%.
Robust Standard Errors are in Parentheses. Insignificant majors are
omitted from the table for readability.

treatment1 (Dollar Value)
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Table 5: Reduced Regression Results, Selection Models
II. Interval MLE (CMP)
I. Heckman MLE
-6.824 **
-8.080 **
(2.812)
(3.477)
treatment2 (Extent of Participation)
5.892 *
7.257 *
(3.176)
(3.792)
treatment3 (Combination)
1.269
1.467
(2.893)
(3.484)
showertime
-0.401 *
-0.482 *
(0.209)
(0.259)
turnofflight
6.288 *
8.127 *
(3.520)
(4.401)
doubleprint
8.235 ***
9.907 ***
(2.639)
(3.104)
greenwork
3.963 *
4.442
(2.267)
(2.743)
certainty
2.241 ***
2.871 ***
(0.445)
(0.538)
male
11.327 ***
12.266 ***
(2.862)
(3.590)
-6.650
-5.906
international
(4.086)
(4.884)
athlete
-4.357 *
-5.298 *
(2.580)
(3.102)
yearinschool
1.019
1.137
(1.114)
(1.301
science
9.166 ***
10.451 ***
(3.266)
(3.814)
sports management
-13.911 ***
-17.309 ***
(4.652)
(6.674)
liveoncampus
-4.087
-4.097
(3.740)
(4.490)
gpa survey
2.900
3.578
(2.654)
(3.324)
income
-0.116
-0.178
(0.113)
(0.163)
constant
9.970
4.022
(13.161)
(16.669)
245.55
F/W Test Statistic
179.31
30.27
Sigma
25.85
0.108
Wald Test for Indep. Eqns. (p-value)
0.0079
5348.928
AIC
7402.821
Note: *Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%. n=1817.
Robust Standard Errors are in Parentheses. Insignificant majors are omitted from the table for
readability.

treatment1 (Dollar Value)
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Appendix A
Variables collected in the survey include:
contribution—the dollar amount per semester selected for the green fee referendum
showertime—average shower time in minutes
fullloadlaundry—how full the laundry machine typically is run (1=full, 0=less than full)
turnofflight—turned off light last time you left an empty room (1=yes, 0=no)
lightingwaste—perceived lighting waste at MLAU (1=minimum waste, 10=maximum waste)
heatacwaste—perceived heating and a/c waste at MLAU (1=minimum waste, 10=maximum waste)
drivingtrips—the number of weekly driving trips
recyclepaper—recycle used paper (1=always yes, usually yes, or sometimes yes, 0=no)
foodwaste—from the amount of food taken, what percentage is typically thrown in the garbage
doubleprint—use of double printing option in library (1=yes, 0=no)
greenwork—current or past involvement in environmental groups/volunteer activities (1=yes , 0=no )
certainty—level of certainty that vote will influence green fee policy at MLAU (0=minimum confidence,
10=maximum confidence)
age—age in years
male—gender (male=1, female=0)
international—international student (1=yes, 0=no)
athlete—athlete on an MLAU team (1=yes, 0=no)
yearinschool—academic standing (1=Freshman, 2=Sophomore, 3=Junior, 4=Senior)

major (some students have more than one major)—economics/business; environmental studies;
science; social science; humanities; arts/music; sports management
liveoncampus—lives on campus (1=yes, 0=no)
#roommates—number of roommates
GPA survey—grade point average on a 4.0 scale self-reported on survey
income—2011 personal income (including gifts, not including money used for tuition/educational fees)
treatment1—dollar value treatment (1=yes, 0=no)
treatment2—extent of participation treatment (1=yes, 0=no)
treatment3—combination treatment (1=yes, 0=no)
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